International symposium
Cognition and Interpretation

Institute of philosophy,
Zagreb, October 10-11, 2003

Elvio Baccarini (Rijeka)
Dispositionalist Moral Epistemology

The contemporary debate on the metaphysical status of moral qualities has most of the time been centered on the idea that moral qualities, if they exist in real world, must be a kind of primary qualities, i.e. qualities that exist there independently of subjects perceiving them, or able to perceive them under some conditions. A different approach says that moral qualities are not completely detached from subjects that perceive them, or may perceive them. However, they are not even qualities totally projected in the world by some subjects. They are dispositions to create a certain kind of evaluative reaction in particular beings, with a specific kind of sensibility. The analogy with secondary qualities is clear. The supporters of this proposal think that they can ground a kind of moral realism, and they express this by metaphors, like that of detection as opposed to that of projection. The naturalistic version of the dispositionalist proposal is analyzed, and a counterargument is offered to show that the metaphor of projection seems more suitable for the dispositionalist proposal, than that of detection.