International symposium
Cognition and Interpretation

Institute of philosophy,
Zagreb, October 10-11, 2003

Majda Trobok (Rijeka)
Platonistic Epistemology in the Philosophy of Mathematics

In this paper I will present the epistemological problem for platonism in the philosophy of mathematics: I will firstly present the problem, see how it has been solved by philosphers and offer another solution of it.
I will not try to prove that platonism is true; I will just try to protect patonism from what is regarded to be the best attack on platonism – Benacerraf’s epistemological attack.
The epistemological argument against platonism, as formulated by Benacerraf, is a powerful one. Platonists have to concede that abstract objects are causally inert. Hence, if some causal link with an object of knowledge were a necessary condition of knowledge, as the causal theory of knowledge supposes, mathematical knowledge platonistically conceived would be impossible. And that much would scotch platonism.
It is however wrong to think that the causal theory of knowledge shows that platonism makes mathematical knowledge impossible. We must not overemphasise the conclusion at this point.
Anyhow, the question still remains: What does mathematical knowledge, as platonistically conceived, consist in? or, even, How is it possible? So, what asnwer should be given to the question: How do we know anything about mathematics?
In the paper I will try to offer an answer to these questions.